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John Norton has advanced a general view of induction—‘Material Theory of
Induction’—that renders ampliative reasoning in a deep sense local. This paper is
a sympathetic appraisal of this view, applying it to the scientific realism debate. It
argues that the scientific realist should turn to such local construal of ampliative
reasoning in her attempt to justify beliefs about unobservables. More generally, the
distinction that Norton draws between ‘material’ and ‘formal’ theories of induc-
tion is helpful in contrasting the intuitions behind various realist arguments, and
in assessing their strengths and weaknesses. As far as justificatory challenges of
induction are concerned, it is in this context that the Material Theory of Induction
pays most dividends.
1 Introduction
Many have defended scientific realism against inductive scepticism. Science pro-
gresses by making various inferences about the unobservable world, and the realists
aims to justify (some of) the resultant beliefs. The cognate arguments are multifarious
and the debate is rambling; there is a real zoo of different positions. It has been said
that there are as many realist arguments as there are realists.
This paper attempts two tasks. In the first place it compares and evaluates a broad
spectrum of realist arguments. This is done by adopting a meta-level perspective, by
discerning the basic intuitions behind different positions, and the types of arguments
these intuitions lead to. We can ask, in particular, whether different realist arguments
naturally couple with different general views on induction. Some recent work on in-
duction is highly pertinent here. John Norton (2004) has characterised induction as
local, rather than global; as material, rather than formal. Norton’s meta-level analy-
sis of induction can be employed to shed light on the whole realism debate. This is
because the various realist positions can also be viewed as global or local, depending
on the generality and form of their arguments. Hence a useful parallel can be drawn
between the spectrum of realist arguments and the spectrum of general views on induc-
tion, regarding their strengths and weaknesses, and underlying intuitions.
Secondly, the paper attempts is to answer the following question. Given Norton’s
local understanding of induction—which I support, with some qualifications—how
∗ADVERTISE HERE! Just kindly tell me what’s wrong with this paper, and you’re in... Seriously though:
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should realism be defended against the selective inductive sceptic? Norton is opti-
mistic about the reverberations of his theory with respect to Hume’s general problem
of induction. Despite my reservations in this regard, I am optimistic regarding the
more narrow problem posed by selective inductive scepticism. I will argue that the
local understanding of induction can to some extent reform the realism debate.
The paper proceeds as follows. The initial third of the paper gives an account of
Norton’s ‘material’ theory of induction, summarising his statement of the position in
§2, and interpreting it further in §3. Then I will look at the zoo of realist positions in §4,
first in the abstract and then in terms of concrete examples. Section §5 draws a parallel
with Norton’s analysis and evaluates its implications to the more global arguments
for realism. The local experimental realist arguments are considered in §6, with the
conclusions that the gist of these arguments suggests how the whole realism debate
should be reformed.
2 Induction localised
Much of philosophy of science has focused on devising theories of induction. Since
the ancient times the Holy Grail has been to find a single (or a small number of) princi-
ple(s) of induction that would lead inductively from true premises to a true conclusion,
with some level of reliability. To this end philosophers have constructed elaborate the-
ories of inductive generalisation, hypothetical induction, and probabilistic induction.
(Norton, 2005) Norton calls such constructions formal theories of induction: they at-
tempt to provide a formal schema to distinguish good, or licit, inductive inferences
independently of case-dependent detail.
The term ‘inductive logic’ is most appropriate for theories of probabilistic induc-
tion. Much like deductive logic, these theories abstract away the content of particular
propositions, and we are left with a formal structure of probabilistic notions that ought
to apply universally to rational belief revision, say, in the face of evidence. Whilst
theories of induction not framed in probabilistic terms—theories of inference to the
best explanation, for example—are clearly not formal in this sense, these constructions
are nevertheless formal in the sense of providing a universal schema which similarly
abstracts away the content of particular explanations. Hence, we end up with general
recipes like this:
IBE: Given the evidence E, we inductively infer whatever would be the
best explanation of E (if it were true), given our background knowledge B.
The advocates of inference to the best explanation argue that we can equally apply
this schema to explain how the Big Bang theory is supported by the data, and how I
make my circadian inference that a piece of bread in my hand nourishes rather than
poisons me. What makes both of these very different inductions licit is the fact that
our evidence is best explained by the conclusions inferred; both inductions are licit qua
instances of IBE.
Norton provides a simple yet credible argument against the ideal of trying to achieve
a satisfactory formal theory of induction: two millennia of effort hasn’t resulted in a
well functioning theory, so perhaps it is high time to recognise the Holy Grail as un-
achievable. And not only have all our efforts failed, but they have failed for the same
reason. For any schema to function it always needs to be supplemented with local
case-dependent detail. That is, there is an ever-present tension between universality
and function. In Norton’s diagnosis of this tension it is the local ‘material postulates’
2
that ultimately do the work in licensing an induction, not the form per se. So, Nor-
ton advocates a material theory of induction instead of any formal one. For him all
inductions are ultimately “underwritten by local material facts.”
To understand what this means, consider the classic case of enumerative inductive
generalisation, for example. There are several good inductive arguments of this form,
of course.
Sample A of lead melts at 327.5 ˚ C
Sample B of lead melts at 327.5 ˚ C
Sample C of lead melts at 327.5 ˚ C
——–
Any lead sample melts at 327.5 ˚ C.
This is (presumably) a licit argument. But this simple form of enumerative induc-
tion is, of course, illicit when the target of generalisation is a kind which is less ho-
mogeneous with respect to the property in question. Hence, one cannot thus infer the
melting point of any sample of plastic, say. What makes the inductive argument above
licit is not its form, argues Norton, but the fact that it is an enumerative induction about
lead (or about an element). This fact is typically left implicit, but it can be included
explicitly as a premise—‘lead (as an element) is uniform in this respect’—rendering
the argument (in this case) deductive, an instance of demonstrative induction. Norton
calls such often unwritten local premises ‘material postulates’.
Similarly, consider the following abductive argument, about the melting point of
mysterious (temporarily) unclassifiable material, suddenly encountered around the globe:
Sample A of the mystery material melts at 100.2 ˚ C
Sample B of the mystery material melts at 100.2 ˚ C
Sample C of the mystery material melts at 100.2 ˚ C
Sample D of the mystery material melts at 100.2 ˚ C
(BE) The best explanation for the regularity is that the mystery material
has a constant melting point at 100.2 ˚ C.
———————–
Therefore, any sample of the mystery material melts at 100.2 ˚ C.
This is (presumably) a reasonably good argument. What makes it so? We should
notice that there are a couple of local parameters that need to be fixed (to get the premise
(BE)) in order to apply the schema IBE. First of all, we need to say what counts as an
explanation in this context. Secondly, we need to say how different explanations are
to be compared so as to make (BE) true. Hence, what makes the above argument
licit is not the fact that it is an instance of the abstract schema of inference to the
best explanation. Rather, Norton argues, it is the fact that in this local context our
judgements regarding the two parameters are such that they ensure this schema really
functions; that is, our judgements reflect the relevant ways the world is (the facts, the
local material postulates).
Like the general recipe of enumerative induction, the abstract abductive schema
IBE also furnishes many an illicit inference. In some contexts our explanatory judge-
ments mislead us. We are prone to look for a causal explanation even when there isn’t
one, and any good conspiracy theory exemplifies how the schema gets misapplied by
us. A well functioning formal theory of induction would tell us when the schema is
applicable, and how the two parameters are fixed. Attempts to ameliorate the schema
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in its universal form are doomed, however: our judgements about what counts as an ex-
planation, and what counts as the best explanation, always get fixed locally, reflecting
the underlying local material facts and the domain under investigation. If we want to
capture what makes a particular abductive argument licit, we always need to include a
local material postulate. This effectively states that in the particular context such-and-
such explanatory virtues are also inductive virtues, reflecting the facts prevailing in the
relevant domain.
More generally, these lessons about enumerative induction and inference to the best
explanation arguably apply across the board. Consider, for example, the Hypothetico-
Deductive model of confirmation with its notorious indiscriminateness: logic does not
rule out arbitrary conjunctions being equally confirmed, and arbitrary disjunctions be-
ing equally confirming. For this scheme to function at all, this underdetermination
needs to be tamed. According to Norton, all the proposed ways to achieve this turn on
tracking local facts. For example, augmenting the HD-model by introducing consider-
ations of simplicity cannot be done in general, universal terms, for ‘our decisions as to
what is simple or simpler depend essentially upon the facts or laws that we believe to
prevail.’ (2004: 656) In dealing with some cyclic phenomena we find sine and cosine
functions nice and simple, instead of attempting to fit a linear curve, say.
Norton extends his thesis to Bayesianism as well: ‘Bayesianism is vacuous until
we ascribe some meaning to the probabilities central to it. Until then, they are just
mathematical parameters. Each way of ascribing meaning brings factual presumptions
with it.’ (2004: 661) It is undeniable that the mathematical parameters need to be
interpreted for the Bayesian probability calculus to model inductive reasoning, but it
seems to me that this interpretation can be provided in rather universal, abstract terms.
Hence Bayesianism does not seem local and case-dependent in quite the same way as,
say, inference to the best explanation. Nevertheless, due to the complete openness of
the prior probabilities Bayesianism all by itself is a rather weak theory, and perhaps it is
best viewed as complementing, rather than competing with other theories of induction
such as inference to the best explanation. (Lipton, 2004) Furthermore, given the focal
point of scientific realism more needs to be said about the inductive method of science,
since it doesn’t seem that realism can be save by Bayesian considerations alone.1
3 What does Norton’s theory achieve?
I have summarised Norton’s explication of his slogans ‘local, rather than global’, and
‘material, rather than formal’. But it is not easy to put a finger on what his theory
exactly achieves. I will now try to provide some further interpretation.
It is important to distinguish here between descriptive and justificatory challenges.
It is one thing to try to describe the way(s) we inductively reason—whether in everyday
or the most advanced scientific life—and whole another thing to justify our ways of rea-
soning as profitable (truth-tracking, or empirical-adequacy-increasing, say). (Lipton,
2004) Norton’s thesis about the locality of induction is first and foremost a descriptive
one. His theory aims to locate a distinction between good inductions and bad induc-
tions, without making any further claim whether are actually in a position to know
which are which. It locates the distinction between licit and illicit not in the form (or
any universally describable feature) of an inductive argument, but in its content. The
lesson is that philosophers have been trying to find informative generality where there
1Douven (2005) aptly criticises a simple Bayesian argument for realism, and goes on to develop a sophis-
ticated alternative. I don’t think this works...
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simply isn’t any, and the Holy Grail has resulted from modelling inductive reason-
ing too closely on deductive reasoning (with its truly universal formal patterns). This
philosophical theory about the distinction between good and bad inductive arguments
does not in itself amount to knowledge that any particular inductive argument is good,
since we may not know that the ‘local material facts’ really are facts, for any particular
induction. So justification is a further question.
Nevertheless, Norton suggests that his theory does have interesting justificatory
repercussions regarding Hume’s problem of induction.2 Hume’s description of induc-
tion focused on enumerative generalisation, and thus his argument against the possibil-
ity of justification of induction naturally turned on the idea that enumerative generali-
sation hangs on the assumption of uniformity of nature. Although it is nowadays clear
that enumerative induction is woefully inadequate as a description of our variegated
ways of inductive reasoning, many think that Hume stated his argument in a general
enough form for it to apply to any form of non-deductive reasoning. Norton disagrees.
For the way that Hume’s problem is typically presented relies explicitly on global and
formal understanding of induction. Consider attempting an inductive justification of
induction. We’ve got our first-order inductions about the world, and we’ve got a meta-
induction about the past success of these first-order inductions. Such constructions,
Hume’s argument goes, are blatantly circular because both arguments are of the same
form: ‘more of the same’. If we are trying to thus establish the reliability of this formal
schema of enumerative induction (irrespective of what the schema is applied to), we
irrefutably end up running in circles.3 But according to the material theory of induc-
tion, no induction is licit purely by virtue of its form anyway. So the classic circularity
challenge is based on a misconstruction of the whole justificatory challenge.
In the material theory of induction, by contrast, a good induction is grounded on
the facts correctly described by the material postulate. So justifying a particular in-
duction is a matter of justifying the relevant material postulate. This material postulate
cannot be just taken as given, and justifying a particular material postulate requires an-
other induction. But this is a different induction, grounded on different facts described
by different material postulates. No circularity ensues, and arguably our best actual
inductions are background-dependent and local in exactly this way:
It merely describes the routine inductive explorations in science. Facts are
inductively grounded in other facts; and those in yet other facts; and so on.
As we trace back the justifications of justifications of inductions, we are
simply engaged in the repeated exercise of displaying the reasons for why
we believe this or that fact within our sciences. (2004: 668)
But isn’t there an obvious regress here? Norton is optimistic in this regard.
What remains an open question is exactly how the resulting chains (or,
more likely, branching trees) will terminate and whether the terminations
are troublesome. As long as that remains unclear, these considerations
have failed to establish a serious problem in the material theory analogous
to Hume’s problem. (2004: 668)
2I will briefly mention this line of thought, and my reservations about it, but I do not wish to get too
embroiled in this debate. (See Okasha, 2006, and references therein) For whatever its outcome is, my
appropriation of Norton’s descriptive thesis to the realism debate is equally valid.
3A logical possibility is to try to justify one schema by applying a meta-induction of a different schema,
to be justified by applying a meta-meta-induction of a yet different schema, and so on. An obvious regress
ensues, and it is not clear what all these different schemas really are.
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The problem is different from Hume’s problem, for sure, but it seems equally dam-
aging to me. It does not seem reasonable that the justification of any induction depends
on justification of further facts in this way. Consider the paradigm induction of the sun
rising tomorrow. For pre-scientific human beings it was a basic regularity of the world.
We now justify this regularity by appealing to different, science-discovered facts as
material postulates. These facts about gravitation and dynamics are more general than
the facts about the sun and the Earth per se, but they are still local by virtue of not
being a priori universal postulates about the worldly uniformity, but local postulates
concerning the dynamical-gravitational aspects of the world (and not the greenness of
the emeralds, say). But how is the science-informed starting point—a more general
basic regularity—any less problematic qua basic regularity? Both regularities are in-
ferred from a finite set of experiences.4 And although there is a sense in which we
have scientifically justified what was taken to be a primitive regularity beforehand—
and hence the scheme ‘describes the routine inductive explorations in science’—the
philosophical challenge of justifying induction concerns the respective starting points.
I do not see any indication that that the regress isn’t going to be infinite and vicious. For
whilst we can give reasons for this or that regularity by appealing to different, broader
regularities, I don’t see any reason to assume that those reasons will converge to our
experiences. What reason do we have to believe that our best science will still work
tomorrow?
In sum, I take Norton’s descriptive thesis about the locality of inductions, of their
inherent background dependency, to be significant. Regarding justification, it does
show that one needs to be more careful how the all-out justificatory challenge is posed.
A typical two line statement of The Problem of Induction is not inline with the fact
that we do not have a universal formal schema (or a set of schemas) to capture the
difference between licit and illicit inductions. However, an equally difficult problem of
justification may remain.
Finally, a clarificatory point regarding the status of global and formal theories of in-
duction that do not take into account Norton’s thesis. Although the locality of induction
needs to be acknowledged, it does not by any means render the descriptive work done
at higher-levels of abstraction wholly redundant. For example, we can gain significant
insight in induction by modelling it in Bayesian or abductive terms, as long as we keep
in mind that these descriptions are not the whole story, but gained by abstracting away
some content that is local and an essential part of what makes the induction licit. But
all in all, Norton’s emphasis on locality is certainly not misplaced.
* * *
Whether my reservations regarding Norton’s dissolution of Hume’s problem are
warranted or not, we can use Norton’s insight vis-a`-vis a more limited problem of in-
duction. First of all, the distinction between formal and material can be used to evaluate
and throw light on the plethora of realist arguments. Secondly, the local understanding
of induction can to some extent reform the realism debate by more explicitly spelling
out the intuitions and motivations behind the various (local) experimental realist argu-
ments.
4Norton rejects the ‘simple argument that that such brute facts are always singular and that no collection
of singular facts can license a universal’, but I don’t understand his argument.
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4 The Realist Zoo
The realist arguments considered here aim defend realism against selective inductive
scepticism, not against Hume’s all-embracing scepticism.5 The realist does not have
to possess an argument against Hume, if we modestly begin with the premise that we
have got some substantive inductive knowledge of unencountered observable affairs
(the sun rising tomorrow, Jupiter having moons etc.). Assuming this much, the chal-
lenge is to argue that we should also take seriously some ampliative inferences to the
unobservable.
The first task is to understand and sort out the various intuitions and motivations
behind the different realist responses to this challenge. There’s a real zoo of arguments
out there. Here are a couple of initial observations.
1. Mirroring the form of the sceptical challenge, the basic form behind each and every
realist argument is this:
We are happy with such-and-such inductions {IO} about the observable.
Such-and-such inductions about the unobservable {IU} are relevantly sim-
ilar to {IO}.
——————-
We should be happy with {IU}.
The various arguments then differ with respect to how inductive inferences are con-
strued and classified, to spell out what the two classes of arguments {IO} and {IU}
are, and in what sense they are ‘relevantly similar’.
2. Different realists are driven by different understandings of the inductive method
of science. Inference to the best explanation is often the central point of contention.
Some say it is a unifying feature of all scientific reasoning, and realism turns on arguing
that explanatory virtue is a truth-tracking virtue. The most optimistic line of thought
appeals to IBE in a rule-circular fashion at the meta-level. Others deny the optimistic
meta-level application of IBE, and argue for realism directly on the grounds that scien-
tific inferences are explanation-driven. Yet others argue for realism without appealing
to explanation at all, preferring to leave it open whether any (extant) descriptive scheme
captures the inductive method.
3. The aim and scope of the realist arguments differ. Some wish to produce a single
overarching argument that does it all, once and for all. Others are happy to argue for
realism about this or that in a more piecemeal fashion. We can talk about global and
local realist arguments, depending on their scope.
We should try to analyse the whole gamut of different arguments. Can we say some-
thing interesting about the way the realists differ in their attitudes towards induction?
Can we analyse the pros and cons of these different leanings, by abstracting away from
the details of particular arguments? We can bring Norton’s novel understanding of
induction as a fundamentally local business to bear on this task. But let’s first take
a bit closer look at the spectrum of realist arguments, first in the abstract and then in
reference to some specific arguments.
5A kind of selective scepticism is typically attributed to van Fraassen.
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4.1 The realist spectrum
Realist arguments can be usefully located on a spectrum spanning from global to local.
The word ‘spectrum’ indicates that locality/globality is a matter of degree. We can also
speak of global and local tendencies to signal one’s realist orientation.
What characterises the global tendency of a realist argument is the attempt to jus-
tify some inductive inferences by reference to some rather general attribute unifying
all these inferences. The local arguments, by contrast, take there to be more justifica-
tory analysis to be done on case-by-case basis. Locality comes in degrees. A set of
inferences can be unified by virtue of some single characteristic/form that acts as the
vehicle of justification for each instance of inductive inference featuring that character-
istic/form. Corresponding to the level of generality at which such characteristic/form is
described—how encompassing the set of such inferences is—we have more local and
less local realist strategies. This abstract preliminary distinction between global and
local is best clarified via concrete examples of actual realist positions.
Advocate Argument Tendency
Boyd / Psillos No-Miracles Argument 100% Global
Lipton 1st-order explanationism Rather global
Kitcher Galilean Strategy Rather global
Hacking / Achinstein Experimental Realism Rather local
? Arguments of Science 100% Local
Where would Norton fall on this spectrum, given his material theory of induction?
Since according to Norton the form of an inference alone never makes it licit, it would
seem that it is never going to be enough for the realist to focus on mere form alone
to unify some inferences across the observable-unobservable boundary. So would his
preferred argument go at all beyond the first-order arguments of science? Do these
scientific reasons in themselves constitute a philosophical argument at all? I’ll come
back to these questions towards the end. Next I will detail some examples furnishing
the table above, before drawing a parallel between this analysis and Norton’s meta-level
analysis of induction.
4.2 Examples
100% Global. The standard explanationist arguments for realism, originating from
Putnam, and finessed by Boyd and Psillos amongst others, are fully global. Psillos
(1999) is a notable recent author in this lineage. He argues (roughly speaking) that the
scientific method is based on inference to the best explanation, and that by a meta-level
use of IBE we can (in the externalist epistemological framework) justify the scientific
use of IBE as truth-tracking. Hence, we’ve got an attempt to justify realism by reference
to an extremely general attribute unifying all scientific inferences to unobservables.
Namely, they are all of the same form: IBE.6
There are a couple of noteworthy ideas underlying Psillos’s global explanationism.
First of all, Psillos (following Harman 1965, and Josephson 1996, 2000) takes IBE to
be a fundamental, primitive foundational form of inductive inference (see Psillos 2002,
6Admittedly there are many subtleties to Psillos argument, regarding the rule-as-opposed-to-premise-
circularity of the meta-level justification, for example, and the fact that Psillos allows for different degrees
of confirmation: not all explanatory inferences are epistemologically on a par as far as their confirmatory
strength goes. But the basic form of the justificatory argument is this, and it is global.
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for example). Secondly, Psillos explicitly appeals to the similarity in the form of our
reasoning about the observable and the unobservable matters, displaying clearly his
underlying intuitions:
Theoretical beliefs in science are formed by means of abductive reason-
ing. But so are most of our every-day commonsense beliefs. Realists have
exploited this fact in order to argue that if one has no reason to doubt com-
monsense abductive reasoning, then one should have no reason to doubt
abduction in science. The pattern of reasoning, as well as justification, are
the same in both cases. (Psillos, 1999: 211, my emphasis)
And on these grounds Psillos accuses the selective sceptic (van Fraassen) of adopt-
ing a selective attitude against inferences about the unobservable:
Clearly, van Fraassen sustains a selective attitude towards IBE. The latter
is a means of going beyond the realms of what has been actually observed
and forming warranted beliefs about unobserved things and processes. Yet
IBE is not a means of forming warranted beliefs about the realm of unob-
servable things or processes. (Psillos, 1996a: 34)
Rather Global. Other realists are wary of a meta-level application of IBE, and also
of the idea that there is pertinent justificatory unity to all scientific inferences that can
be viewed as abductive in form. Yet some of these realists wish to tap into the pivotal
explanatory dimension of science, and appeal to explanatory virtues in a less global
way. These realists argue that the gap between ampliative inferences to observables, on
the one hand, and to unobservables, on the other hand, is bridged by virtue of the fact
that the respective inferences are not only of the same general form (IBEs), but also of
the same more specific ‘inferential kind’.
Lipton (2004) presents such an argument. He develops an overarching descriptive
account of confirmation and induction in terms of inference to the best explanation.7
Regarding the justificatory challenge of realism, he puts forward a very general argu-
ment to unify and justify a significant class of abductive inferences of science. After
repudiating the No-Miracles Argument, Lipton considers a less global, first-order ex-
planationist strategy:
Can explanationism defend realism instead by appeal to the structure of
those first-order inferences? ... The structure of causal inferences is the
same, whether the cause is observable or not. ... So there is a prima facie
case for saying that all these inferences should be construed in the same
way: granting the truth-tropism of inferences to observable causes, we
ought also all to be realists about inferences to unobservable causes, since
the inferences have the same form in both cases. (2004: 199–200, my
italics)
Although Lipton avoids a meta-level global abductive inference about science, he
still provides a very general template for the justification of scientific inferences. For
him any scientific first-order instance of causal abduction is (probably) approximately
true by virtue of being ‘structurally similar’ to everyday ampliative reasoning about
7Unlike Psillos, Lipton is not a totalitarian ‘IBE fundamentalist’, claiming that all inductive inferences
are best construed as abductive. Rather, for him inference to the best explanation simply plays a significant
role in understanding inductive reasoning.
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the observable. Pace Psillos, Lipton takes it to be incumbent on the realist to pro-
vide a more specific description of the kind of abductive reasoning that allows us to
generalise from the everyday theorising to the scientific. Hence Lipton stresses the
causal-contrastive mode of IBE. But is that enough said? I will return to this below.
How local is this species of justificatory argument? It depends on how tightly the
relevant ‘inferential kind’ is delineated. Just appealing to causal explanations (spelled
out as contrastive explanations – cf. Lipton 2004, ch. 3) yields a rather global argu-
ment. The notion of contrastive causal explanation is a broad one, even at the level of
observable matters.
Rather local. At the local end of the spectrum we have got a set of arguments whose
advocates are collectively known as experimental realists.8 Experimental realists do
not (have to) advocate any level of explanationism, not even as a significant descriptive
thesis about the scientific method. Traditional questions about general characterisa-
tion of induction are simply irrelevant to their realist arguments, for these arguments
for realism about some theoretical posit do not rely on the idea that a scientific infer-
ence to this posit has a particular form. Rather, these local arguments rely on domain,
or case-specific considerations, typically closely following the reasons that scientists
themselves supply for their beliefs about something unobservable. For example, re-
garding the classic paradigm of an unobservable entity, the atom, it has been popular to
examine Perrin’s original reasoning to the existence of atoms on the basis of Brownian
motion. (Achinstein, 2002; Miller, 1987; Salmon, 1984)
Although the individual realist arguments differ considerably in detail and rhetoric,
in my interpretation of them there is a common pattern to be seen. All the “experimen-
tal” arguments—I will question the aptness of the title below—seem to rely on some
local basic assumptions about the uniformity of the world, crossing the observable-
unobservable boundary. The unwritten premise is that such uniformity assumptions
are simply as innocent as the assumption required for us to induce, say, the sun rising
tomorrow. The uniformity assumptions pertain to local matters, and the corresponding
epistemic warrant is thus localised.
Achinstein (2002) is the latest (and the clearest) representative of this line of thought.
He analyses Jean Perrin’s reasoning to the existence of atoms as causal-eliminative,
also giving a more general account of the conditions on which this kind of reasoning is
justified. Achinstein presents Perrin’s reasoning as follows (2002: 474)
1. Given what is known, the possible causes of effect E (for example,
Brownian motion) are C, C1,. . . , Cn (for example, the motion of
molecules, external vibrations, heat convection currents).
2. C1,. . . , Cn do not cause E (since E continues when these factors are
absent or altered).
So probably
3. C causes E.
Observing the microscopic particles dancing around, continually accelerating and de-
celerating, indicates the existence of internal forces responsible for such behaviour,
8Some of the entity realist arguments (e.g. Hacking, 1982.) are also naturally interpreted as belonging to
this category.
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assuming that no plausible external cause can be found. And the meticulous experi-
ments performed by Guoy did indeed allow Perrin to eliminate the plausible external
candidate causes C1,. . . , Cn. The various experiments performed by himself and oth-
ers then allow Perrin to claim quantitative evidence for his initial conclusion and for
the numerical value of Avogadro’s constant.
This reasoning raises two obvious anti-realist worries. First of all, there is the pos-
sibility that the hypothesis of internal molecular forces singled out by the eliminative
reasoning is merely the best of a bad lot. How do we know that all the possible al-
ternative causes of the phenomenon have been cited and eliminated by experiments?
Achinstein’s response is to insist that the realm of possibility here is restricted by our
background knowledge.
The claim that the possible causes cited probably include the actual one
can be defended by appeal to the fact that the phenomenon in question is
of a certain type that, experience has shown, in other cases is caused by
one or the other of the causes cited. (2002: 478)
But this immediately raises the second anti-realist worry: how can we justify in-
ferences to the unobservable on the basis of the observable, on the basis of what ‘our
experience has shown’? For example, in Perrin’s argument we need to justify the induc-
tive generalisation from ‘All observed accelerating bodies in contact with other bodies
exert forces on them’ to ‘All accelerating bodies, including molecules (if any exist), in
contact with other bodies exert forces on them’ (ibid., 481). And empiricists like van
Fraassen, of course, take such inductive inferences to the unobservable to be unjustified
and unjustifiable.
Achinstein responds to this second worry as follows, bringing the locality of his
argument to the fore. The idea is that the realist can provide a positive empirical reason
for taking observability not to be a biasing condition for an inductive generalisation
from a sample.
One can vary conditions or properties in virtue of which something is ob-
servable (or unobservable). For example, items can be observable (or un-
observable) in virtue of their size, their distance from us in space or time,
their duration, their interactions (or lack of them) with other items, and
so on. ... If we vary the conditions in virtue of which bodies are ob-
servable and find no differences in whether bodies have mass, and if we
have no contrary empirical information, then we have offered an empiri-
cal argument to support the claim that the fact that all observed bodies are
observable does not bias the observed sample with respect to the property
of having mass. (ibid, 484–485)
Hence, the anti-realist’s selective scepticism should feel some tension here. In partic-
ular, the kind of variation in the conditions and properties that the realist here appeals
to arguably also count for the legitimacy of ampliative inferences about unobserved
observables. So whence the difference? After all, the logical possibility of observ-
ability being a biasing condition is on a par with the logical possibility of having been
observed being a biasing condition.
The locality of Achinstein’s argument resides in the fact that it concerns only a very
particular uniformity of the world: the relevant mass-related properties (e.g. conserva-
tion of momentum for massive bodies) are independent of the properties in virtue of
which bodies are observable, or otherwise. Achinstein’s realist analysis takes explicitly
11
into account those local matters of fact which underwrite Perrin’s inductive argument
for the existence of atoms. And his response against the selective sceptic turns on a
kind of Tu Quoque: arguably our inductive inferences about the unobserved (but not
unobservable) massive bodies are underwritten by material postulates that are episte-
mologically no different from the ones used by the local realist.
* * *
Many arguments in this last class are notoriously imprecise and rhetorical (but also
intuitively pulling, e.g. Hacking, 1982), and a certain amount of interpretation is re-
quired. The interpretative gloss presented here, emphasising the locality of the ar-
guments, gains impetus from the following observation. Many have reacted to these
arguments by objecting that they are just as abductive in form as the standard ‘theory-
realist’ argument based on the success of science (‘the miracles argument’). (e.g. Resnik,
1994; Psillos, 1999) These reactions are unsurprising: if one is looking for a global and
formal justification of induction, the experimental realist arguments seem to rely on an
abductive form. However, the intuition driving the local realist is that the justificatory
work is done at the level of local material assumptions. The fact that a realist argu-
ment turning on a material assumption can be naturally construed as an inference to
the best explanation is wholly irrelevant, given the very different view on what makes
an induction licit.
5 Parallels with Norton’s analysis of induction
Having sketched some prominent arguments on the realist spectrum, we can now dis-
cern interesting parallels with Norton’s analysis of induction. Given the foregoing
(interpretation-laden) outline of the various positions, this is straightforward.
The (more) global arguments are driven by (more) emphasis on (more) formal sim-
ilarities, whilst the domain/case-specific details are downplayed. The seeming advan-
tage of these arguments is that one gets more with less: a justification of a significant
class of scientific inferences by their shared form, without having to pay much atten-
tion on what these inferences are about. The downside is an increased epistemic risk
which, I will argue, is unacceptable. By contrast, the (more) local arguments have
(more) emphasis on domain-specific factual matters. Local realists are happy to ad-
mit that justification of knowledge of the unobservable world is a business that always
hangs on local matters of fact driving the ampliative inferences. Although this is not
how the “experimental” arguments are typically portrayed, I will claim that this is the
best way to cash out the underlying intuition. (Section §6).
Given this parallel, we can provide a meta-level argument against the global ten-
dency in realist arguments. The global realist arguments suffer from what could be
termed the Description–Justification Gap. Too much emphasis is paid on formal de-
scriptive unity, without realising that descriptive unity can be cheap, and does not
amount to justificatory unity. The former can be achieved at the level of abstract induc-
tion schemas, but the latter requires more. Since a licit induction is always underwritten
by a material postulate, we need to make sure to give some justification at that level
as well. But this is exactly what is missing in the realist arguments which attempt to
cross the gap between the observable and the unobservable by comparing the respec-
tive inductive inferences vis-a`-vis their form, or structure. Worse still, the ambitious
meta-level use of inference to the best explanation appeals to a descriptive unity on a
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much wider scale, now spanning from scientific to philosophical explanations.9 Given
how open the required characterisation of IBE is, the two parameters (cf. section §2)
determining what counts as an explanation, and what counts as a good explanation, are
left wide open. But the mere form of an inference cannot carry the justificatory burden.
It is insufficient for the realist to not have any reason to think that a particular
inference form is unreliable in some unobservable domain, given its reliability in some
observable domain. More than that is required: a positive reason to think that the
respective inferences are in same epistemological boat. To have a reason to suspect an
inductive inference in a particular theoretical context requires a reason to suspect that
the material postulate underwriting that inference does not correspond to the worldly
facts. For example, we have such grounds to suspect the inductive generalisation from
‘All Turkish adult males I’ve encountered are bearded’ to ‘All adult male Turks are
bearded’. We know enough of human beings to know that nationality simply isn’t a
strong enough unifying factor in this respect. But not having such negative grounds for
suspecting an induction does not amount to having positive grounds for it, either. For
example, we may not have any particular reason to suspect that scientists’ evaluation of
the explanatory virtues in quantum physics is any less reliable than farmers’ evaluation
of the explanatory virtues required to catch a flock-harassing beast. But we may not
have any positive reason to think that the explanatory virtues are on a par as inductive
virtues either. And surely the abductive form of the respective inferences isn’t enough
on its own, given the huge difference in the domains and the kinds of inferences made.10
Norton describes a tension between functioning of a descriptive inference schema,
and its universality. The global justificatory arguments are under pressure to go more
local, too, to rule out illegitimate use of cheap descriptive generalisations. For this
reason (I think) Lipton focuses more narrowly on causal-contrastive explanations. But
this is still an attempt to justify a rather wide class of explanation-driven inferences by
a single argument, corresponding to the rather open notion of causal explanation (un-
derstood in contrastive terms). Although the unifying characteristic here is not purely
formal—a causal explanation obviously needs to reflect a causal fact about the world—
it does not seem that this alone captures what makes each instance of causal-contrastive
abductive inference licit. There is still much contextual variability in how the best ex-
planation is chosen.11 One could respond by further narrowing down the class of ab-
ductive inferences by fixing more case-dependent variables. This clearly amounts to
more local realism. But how local should we go?
6 The realism debate reformed?
The justificatory challenge for the realist, as described in section §4, is to argue for
a Unity of Inductions that makes selective scepticism unnatural and unappealing. The
9Explaining the success of the scientific method by its truth-tracking ability is a philosophical explana-
tion, albeit a naturalistic one.
10See also Magnus’s critique of Kitcher’s Galilean strategy (2003). Kitcher’s strategy is quite global, and
subject to corresponding difficulties. The main difference between Kitcher and the rather global arguments
considered above is that Kitcher does not operate at the level of forms of inductive inferences, but rather
finds the relevant unity at the level of their success-conditions.
11According to Lipton ’for the causal explanations of events, explanatory contrasts select causes by means
of the Difference condition: To explain why P rather than Q, we must cite a causal difference between P and
not-Q, consisting of a cause of P and the absence of a corresponding event in the case of not-Q’ (2004: 42)
This is clearly a rather open characterisation of what is required of these explanations, and much hangs on
case-dependent detail. For example, the notion of ‘corresponding event’ is highly contextual, and get fixed
by the situation at hand.
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literature contains a great variety of ways to argue for such unity, and I have argued that
the intuitions behind the different arguments correspond to more local and more global
understanding of induction. This offers a useful way to order the sprawling debate, for
comparison and evaluation of the alternatives.
Assuming that Norton’s insight about the locality of induction is correct, what are
its repercussions on the realism debate? For one thing, there seems to be a serious
problem with the global arguments. This is due to the gap between achieving a de-
scriptive unity and achieving a justificatory unity: we haven’t been given any positive
reason to think that the kind of descriptive unity that the global arguments capitalise
on amounts to a relevant justificatory unity. This pushes the realist towards the local
argumentative strategies. I have argued that the “experimental” realist arguments can
be viewed as (rather) local arguments. But this raises further questions. What is the
best way to construe these local arguments in general terms? Exactly how local are
they? I’ll finish the paper with some tentative remarks on these issues.
The material theory of induction acknowledges that any licit inductive argument has
both a form, and an underlying material postulate. The global realist arguments try to
argue for the Unity of Inductions at the level of the shared form, whilst the local realist
arguments are construed as depending on an analysis of the relevant material postulates.
Hence, the justificatory work is done by comparing the material postulates correspond-
ing to inductions-to-observables, on the one hand, and inductions-to-unobservables,
on the other. But this general way of putting it makes it clear that these arguments
have nothing to do with “experiments”, or “entities” per se. Rather, they have to do
with a local-as-opposed-to-global, material-as-opposed-to-formal, comparison of the
respective inductions.
But the material postulates underwriting inductions to the observable and to the
unobservable, respectively, are still going to be different, of course, so there is no
question of identifying the postulates required by the realist with those required by the
selective sceptic. The best one can do is still a judgement of the naturality, or other-
wise, of drawing the line of epistemic incredulity at some point. This is how realists
have always argued, admitting that there is always ample logical room for inductive
scepticism, selective or not. This is just the nature of induction qua non-deduction.
But of the various ways of arguing against the unnatural scepticism of the anti-
realist, the local approach, I maintain, is the best. This follow from Norton’s insight.
For if the local material facts are what make an induction licit, then the realist takes an
unnecessary epistemic risk by appealing to descriptive unity. By appealing to the form
of an inference, instead of its material postulates, raises the possibility that an inductive
inference is taken to be licit when there is no relevant material fact to underwrite it. Of
course, the stronger the appeal to descriptive unity, the higher the epistemic risk. But
the absolute minimum—corresponding to the strongest realist arguments—is achieved
by focusing on material postulates themselves.
But how local are these arguments then? Do they go beyond the first-order scientific
reasoning at all? Sure they do. The local realist arguments are bona fide philosophi-
cal arguments. Scientists latch onto the correct material postulates by the methods of
science which may or may not make the material postulates transparent. If a scientist
appeals to a theory T because it is the simplest and the most unifying, it a task for
the philosopher to make explicit how these contextual judgements of simplicity and
unification reflect the local material facts, given the scientific background knowledge
of the domain in question. Only once material postulates have been made transparent
can we compare them with the sorts of local assumptions that are needed to underwrite
inductions to the observable. Hence, although the specific arguments of local realism
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hang on case-dependent detail, its master plan can be described in general terms. This
presents a new challenge for the philosophers of science, reforming the realism debate.
The recurring question is: can we argue for realism about this, or that, in terms of local
material postulates?
To conclude by paying homage to Norton’s insight, it can be pointed out that at
times his writing comes very close to what I have said above. For example, Norton’s
discussion of the control of inductive risk is suggestive:
As long as the inductive risk resides within the schema, we must assess
it through a highly problematic judgment of the overall reliability of the
relevant schema. We have little chance of coming to a clear judgment
let alone determining how to reduce the risk. However once the risk is
relocated in a material postulate in some local domain, our assessment
of the inductive risk will depend in large measure on our confidence in
the material postulate. If the inductive risk is great, we now also have a
program for reducing it. We should seek more evidence relevant to the
material postulate and perhaps even modify the material postulate in the
light of the evidence. The result will be a more secure induction. (2004:
665)
This guidance is given in the context of how science uses induction. My claim is
that the realist philosopher arguing for realism should follow suit. And this is exactly
the spirit of the local realist arguments: rely more on detailed scientific practice, on the
first-order reasons that convinces a scientist, knowledgeable of those ‘local material’
details, of the existence of something.
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